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Abstract
Yemen is one of the poorest countries on the Arabian Peninsula. It is beset 
with numerous geographic and demographic problems including serious water 
shortages, depleting oil reserves, rapid population growth and a dispersed rural 
population. The government has endorsed a western-style democracy in order 
to address these issues, but has at the same time deliberately marginalized 
a functional tribal system and further weakened traditional values that could 
have had a strong role to play in governance. The current state monopoly over 
tribal politics is not conducive to positive social change, and tribal politics needs 
to become carefully integrated into the system in a way that is recognized by 
all persons involved. Government priorities should primarily involve getting the 
whole of society involved in the tribal question. Tribal confl icts needs to be 
properly dealt with, and ways to integrate tribal laws into the judicial system 
must be found. There is a need to engage with local communities and people’s 
trust in the government must also be enhanced. Projects implemented by the 
international donor community have so far focused on specifi c sectors, and lack 
a larger framework of action in addition to incentives for sustainable cooperation. 
Donors need a clear and transparent agenda, effective communications with 
society, and also a greater understanding of the local political economy.
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Executive Summary
Yemen has undergone various political experiments that have left it weaker 
and poorer today than it has ever been. Although Yemen is the only democratic 
state in the Arabian Peninsula, it has yet to harvest the results of this democra-
cy; for it has a president who has been in power for 28 years and a tribal culture 
that undermines the state’s capacities for action and effectiveness.
Yemen’s estimated population is 18.5 million, with 75% of the Yemeni popu-
lation residing on rural and rugged terrain. The government of Yemen lacks the 
capacity to deliver basic services to a majority of the areas as a result of the 
diffi cult demographic and geographical considerations of the country, a lack of 
policy planning and because of endemic corruption. Development challenges 
continue to cause massive governance problems, ones which strike at the core 
of every sector.
The need to address the issue of democratic governance in Yemen is vital 
given the current poverty and corruption indicators. The challenges that are 
facing Yemen in the economic, social and political arenas require a better de-
gree of awareness and policy planning in order to prevent instability and crisis. 
There is also rising discourse and interest in these fi elds from both donors and 
government, made more sensitive given the fact that Yemen sees some of the 
most important government domains as being internal politics, which do not 
need to be publicized or made responsible within the international development 
system.
In this paper, I will argue that western-style democracy, which has been 
endorsed by Yemen, has serious fl aws. It has deliberately marginalized a func-
tional tribal system and further weakened traditional values that could have had 
a strong role to play in governance. Tribes are the nucleus of Yemeni society; 
and they are not an add-on that one might easily overlook. Integrating tribal 
leaders into the current state’s politics and affairs is one thing, though it should 
also serve to develop tribal governance systems in such a way that the rapid 
urbanization that Yemen is going through is also dealt with. 
Donors’ naiveté with regard to the existing social networks and political 
economy of the country, coupled with a fear of Islamic extremism, have often 
contributed to a weakening of the essence of democratic values in Yemen. 
Also, the current democratic culture has produced isolated political elites, ones 
standing apart from a mass of people who have got no awareness of their politi-
cal rights or of how to use them. Yemeni democracy has been unable to deliver 
on basic concepts of social equity, human rights, equal participation and law 
and order. 
This study shows that, in a place like Yemen, where tribalism has always 
showed resistance to the powers of the state, implementing democracy without 
strengthening governance throws into question the credibility of the democratic 
process. Additionally, most government institutions fall short of their supposed 
overriding goal of working in the public interest. People know that their system 
is ineffi cient – thus, their belief in the government becomes weaker in the ab-
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sence of a clear, fair and predictable system. This paper therefore examines 
some of the hidden tools that might be able to play a role in democratic gover-
nance in Yemeni democracy in particular – and in the Middle East in general. 
Comprehensive, sustainable work for Arab regions, as carried out by foreign 
authorities, needs to take into account that there is great resistance to western 
concepts that are carried through by authoritarian domestic governments.
A state monopoly over tribal politics is not conducive to positive social 
change; tribal politics need to become carefully integrated into the system in a 
way that is recognized by all persons involved. 
There will be no respect for the rule of law enforced by the state so long as 
there is a higher power that has its own set of counteracting rules. Government 
and tribes in Yemen clash repeatedly, in a subtle manner, causing chaos and 
disorder in the state. For the government to truly institutionalize democratic pol-
icies, it needs to play a crucial role in integrating the different segments of this 
society and provide equal chances for participation. For this to happen, deeper 
political reforms – beyond elections – must take place; ones that weaken cur-
rent obstacles to economic growth, such as corruption and lack of accountabil-
ity. The most promising type of political reform is that which will enable society 
to better participate in its own development process via increasingly represen-
tative and effi cacious political institutions, leading to tangible improvements in 
the conditions of life.
In addition, the majority of the Yemeni people continue to feel vulnerable, as 
they do not have the necessary tools that will allow them to change their situa-
tions. Illiteracy plays a big role in holding back the effective participation of the 
Yemeni public; while the intellectual Yemeni capital is poor, and often resides 
outside the country.
This paper thus calls for greater consolidated action so that the government 
will play a positive role in bringing together the various segments of this soci-
ety and provide equal chances for people’s participation. It calls for donors to 
be more pragmatic in their approach to governance, to recognize the informal 
rules of governance and to endorse political reforms that go beyond traditional 
western systems and in the direction of Yemeni ones.
1 Background and Introduction
1.1 Background
What was once Arabia Felix stands now to be one of the poorest countries 
in the world. Yemen’s present economic, social and development situation has 
fl uctuated unevenly in the last three decades, causing an unstable political and 
economic environment1. Among the major problems that contribute to the pov-
1 In ancient times, Yemen had relatively fertile land and adequate rainfall, with a moister 
climate helping to sustain a stable population - a feature recognized by the ancient Greek 
geographer Ptolemy, who described Yemen as Eudaimon Arabia (better known in its Latin 
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erty are limited access to basic services, a very high fertility rate (6.7%), high 
illiteracy rates – especially among females (73.5%), high unemployment (40%), 
signifi cant gender inequalities, gaps concerning a number of development in-
dicators, and a non-renewable water supply which is dwindling at an alarming 
rate.2 
1.1.1 In the same context…
The population continues to multiply, with a growth rate of around 3.5-3.8%, 
which is one among the highest in the world. The population is expected to 
double in the next 20 years, growing to about 43 million inhabitants by 2025, a 
fi gure entirely incompatible with available economic resources. Yemen is also 
challenged by a water crisis that leaves 90 percent of the population with less 
than a minimum amount for domestic supply; in addition, only 69% of the popu-
lation has access to drinking water.
Despite all of these alarming indicators; the Republic of Yemen (RoY) has 
always had a low profi le among donors, for several reasons (mentioned later). 
However, there was a shift in interest and in the magnitude of donors’ assis-
tance after the September 11 attacks on the US.  The new era of trust and co-
operation between Yemen and the international donor community needs to be 
looked at carefully, therefore, with regard to recognizing incentives for change 
and sustainability of cooperation.
Political observers have multiple and differing ‘end scenarios’ for this Ye-
meni era, none of which concludes by foreseeing an optimistic, stable environ-
ment for the country. Confl ict is likely, hunger is another possibility, and further 
economic disparities are always to be expected. Policy papers coming from 
human rights organizations to political activists transmit warnings of a poorer 
Yemen and a chaotic one. Yet, at the same time, the people who are predicting 
these scenarios are the ones who are involved in active cooperation with the 
Yemeni government. Most donor reports for almost every project point to suc-
cesses being had with regard to poverty, governing or democracy-seeking proj-
ects – though they always conclude that neither the efforts nor the resources 
are enough, and that more needs to be done.
Yemen’s development assistance has been limited, minimal, and carefully 
tailored by the very fact that this is a country that needs so much help. In addi-
tion, development requirements have been set to a high and challenging stan-
dard, which the Yemeni government has failed to comply with. Development 
assistance for Yemen as delivered by the International donor community has 
focused on trying to implement projects in specifi c sectors, though without hav-
ing a larger framework of action that would serve to examine policy content.
translation, Arabia Felix) meaning “fortunate Arabia.”
2 The Sabean kingdom, from the 10th century BC to the 6th century AD; the Awasan kingdom 
from the 10th to the 5th century BC; Ma’in kingdoms from the 7th BC to 1st AD; the Qataban from 
the 5th BC to the 1st AD; Hadramaut from the 5th BC to the 3rd AD; and the Himyar from the 2nd 
BC to the 6th AD
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1.2 Introduction
1.2.1 Tribal Heritage
Yemen is reputed to be one of the oldest centers of civilization in the Near 
East. Archeological evidence of advanced irrigation and agrarian systems were 
found in Yemen as early as the third millennium BC. Many kingdoms have ruled 
the land – from the early 10th Century BC until now. 3 Yemen tribes trace their 
ancestry back to Qahtan, a descendant of Noah. Their existence went to form 
the state, and their coalitions were important for the protection of land. Contin-
ual wars, economic upsets and the instability of the Arabian kingdoms in olden 
times have contributed to the further fragmentation of tribes, even though tribal 
heritage and culture still prevails in Yemen.
1.2.2 Historical Snapshots of Yemeni Politics
‘Imam after Imam, and a Government more unjust than Sinan’4.’ This sar-
castic saying is intended to describe the slow change that is happening in the 
current state politics of Yemen. The Yemeni people do not see any difference 
between an Imam and a president – and they continue to feel vulnerable in the 
face of the government’s authority and power. The transition from an authoritar-
ian Imam rule to a Yemeni Republic has had a huge impact on Yemeni society, 
yet the politics remains the same. 
Yemeni tribes have played different roles at central and rural levels, and on 
the level of the political elites that have been competing for power throughout 
the history of Yemen, whether in the past rule of the Imams or in the current one 
of the Yemeni Republic; and there is a fascinating continuity between the past 
and the present that one can witness through the methods used by rulers for 
acquiring and making use of their power.
Northern Yemen has a social structure of a tribal nature, which was often 
manipulated in the past by Imams.5 In the early twenties, the former northern 
Yemen managed to gain control of the tribes by methods that were both ex-
treme and hostile.6 
The transition from a tribal structure to a more organized form of civil identity 
has often been complicated – and was often left unattended in the early rule of 
the Imam. It was best for Imams to keep tribes at loggerheads with each other 
in order to shore up their own power and personal wealth. In 1948, Imam Yahiya 
died during an unsuccessful coup attempt, and his son Ahmed succeeded him 
– ruling the northern parts of Yemen in an era of darkness, ignorance, growing 
3  Yahia bin Al Qasim, The joy of time in the history of Yemen events, page 475
4  Imam Yahia of the Mutawakiliat Kingdom, which existed between 1911 and 1962, was able 
to unify the tribes - and he took military action against the Ottoman rulers, which forced the Ot-
toman government to sign a treaty acknowledging his sovereignty in the area. At that time, the 
Mutwakilait Kingdom was created, and it witnessed a large amount of resistance from tribes.
5  The Imam kept some of the tribal sheikhs’ sons and relatives hostage, and would have 
killed them if the tribes opposed his rule. The Imams also used divide-and-rule tactics against 
tribes, which increased their control over them.
6  Arab nationalist objectives had by Egyptian President Gamal Abdul Nasser.
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repression and growing pressure to support the Nasseriat movement7. After the 
revolution of September 1962 and the declaration of the Yemen Arab Republic, 
a civil war followed, until the early seventies, having with it a period of presiden-
tial assassination8. President Ali Abdullah Saleh assumed power in 1978, and 
his era has had a degree of political stability and relative tribal control.
As for Southern Yemen, the case is different: The fall of Aden, in 1839, 
into the hands of the British marked the formal separation of the South from 
the North. Aden was made a crown colony, and the remaining land became 
the East Aden and West Aden protectorates. By 1965, most of the tribal states 
within the protectorates and the Aden colony proper had joined up to form the 
British-sponsored federation of South Arabia. The country declared its indepen-
dence on November 30, 1967, and was named the People’s Republic of South 
Yemen – but was renamed the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen in 1970 
after radicals with a Marxist Leninist ideology supported by the former USSR 
(making the Southern Yemen, at that time, the only communist regime in the 
entire Arab World) came to power. 
Tribes’ existence in the Southern regime was of a different nature than in 
the North. Southern tribal lands stretched principally across the hinterlands of 
Hadramout and to the west of Aden; they were of a horizontal nature, and were 
ruled by Sultans, Sheikhs or Emirs. The Marxist regime was resilient to any 
tribal ideology, and it worked ruthlessly to weaken tribes and restrict their power 
in the cities9, thereby modernizing the state in a sense that would completely 
avoid tribal concerns.
North and South Yemen began fumbling with the idea of a unifi ed Yemen 
around 1971. However, tensions between the YAR and PDRY escalated into 
armed confl ict during the late seventies. Real progress on unifi cation was fi -
nally made in 1988, when the YAR and PDRY agreed to renew discussions on 
unifi cation as well as establish a joint oil exploration project, and to demilitarize 
the border, allowing Yemeni unrestricted border-crossing passage based on a 
national identifi cation card. The Republic of Yemen was fi nally declared on May 
22, 1990, with Ali Abdullah Saleh as President and Ali Salim Al-Bidh as Vice 
President.
This Northern and Southern unity was a major event for the whole of the 
Arab world. The celebrations and happiness accompanying the merger of the 
two regimes gave aspirations to the people, as this was viewed as a small step 
in the dream of achieving greater unity with Arab countries, and in a democratic 
manner. Yet in spite of the historical unifi cation of North and South Yemen and 
the free multi-party elections that were held in 1993, the country plunged into 
civil war, in 1994, for economic and political reasons beyond the scope of this 
paper; while tribal predominance never failed to surface among a population 
suffering from poverty and illiteracy.
7  Two out of fi ve presidents were assassinated: Ibrahim Al hamdi, 1974-77, and Ahmad Al 
Gashmi, 1977-78
8  Tribesmen were ordered to disarm in rural areas as well as in the cities
9  ICG Report p. 13.
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1.2.3 Tribes: Why do we need to address this issue? Why don’t we just let 
them evolve gradually and live the way they used to?
Various reports from human rights organizations, the media and civil soci-
ety organizations document an alarming number of tribal killings in Yemen over 
cases like revenge and land disputes – so there is a pressing need to deal with 
these issues. According to the International Crisis Group, the situation is be-
lieved to be getting worse, although this may refl ect an increased public aware-
ness that leads to more of these cases being reported;10 while the number of 
women and children accidentally injured or killed in tribal confl icts may be ris-
ing, though this too may be a product of better reporting. There is some indica-
tion, however, that the use of increasingly lethal weaponry and the erosion of 
tribal ‘norms’ that severely sanction doing harm to “vulnerable” groups such as 
women and children have contributed to the rise in the number of injuries and 
deaths.11 
Tribal mechanisms play an important role in resolving confl icts by providing 
a system for the arbitration and mediation of local disputes in a manner that is 
much quicker than the state’s. However, although they are effi cient because of 
the more simple nature of dealing with these things from a tribal perspective, it 
doesn’t guarantee that the process is fair or less corrupt than the more ‘formal’ 
legal processes at the state level.
2 Tribal Domination and Lack of Infl uence
We are yet to see a positive aspect to tribal domination in Yemen. Although 
the Republic of Yemen has allowed for tribal politics to be integrated into the 
current system, tribalism still fails to have a defi nitive nature for Yemeni citizens, 
for it confl icts with the rule of law, resists the infl uence of the courts and it stands 
apart from strategic policy areas. In fact, tribes often hold the government ac-
countable for the shortage of service delivery; though will not acknowledge any 
duties they have with regard to the government or society.
2.1 Tribes: The Informal Government of Yemen
 Yemen consists of tribes scattered into 113,000 localities and villages that 
have various levels of infl uence and power in the Yemeni Government. Tribal 
leadership plays a vital role in Yemeni politics, but it doesn’t necessarily provide 
it with strategic vision or represent wider society’s interests. For more than 40 
years, the Yemeni government has been unable to control all of its territory 
because of the tribal dominance in some areas. Some of the tribes have been 
loyal to the state, while others have had their own reservations about the way 
they were governed.
10  ICG Report, p. 14.
11  A precipitous drop in foreign aid, a huge infl ux of returning workers following the Gulf war, 
the end of remittances, drought, civil war, Sada’a war, etc.
FATIMA ABO AL ASRAR: DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE IN A TRIBAL SYSTEM
10
Despite the achieving of political stability and some economic improve-
ments, Yemen is considered one of the poorest countries in the region. There 
are serious water shortages (decreasing underground water reserves and scant 
rainfall, no surface water – such as rivers or lakes), oil limitations (depleting oil 
reserves/annual production), rapid population growth (3.02% per annum), very 
limited agricultural land for food production, a dispersed population, remote 
geographical locations that are hard to reach with services such as educa-
tion, health care, water, etc., and a weak institutional and fi nancial capacity 
with which to deal with all these rapid changes. Such shocks have caused the 
tribes and wider Yemeni public to believe that the government is not capable of 
implementing decentralized change that would be able to reach all segments of 
society. Promises made to the tribes – of prosperity and urban modernization, 
that were delivered as soon as the revolution took place in 1962 – were crippled 
by a series of macroeconomic shocks12. In addition, the government has imple-
mented different macroeconomic reforms recommended by the World Bank 
and the IMF, which restrict spending on public sectors. The tribes thus realized 
that the GOY cannot be strong without their presence.
Most studies 13have indicated that tribes have provided a balance in Ye-
meni politics and have played a vital role in terms of holding the government 
to account.  Such studies however, paid specifi c attention to the role of tribal 
leadership rather than to tribal society. The majority of the population, whether 
urban, rural or tribal, continues to be governed by elites and is subjected to 
tribal customs rather than the government’s rule of law. This has had various 
implications for Yemeni people, where persons with weak or no tribal affi liations 
continue to feel vulnerable. 
As long as illiteracy prevails in Yemen, access to political participation will 
always be limited; and ignoring the tribal experience that has governed for cen-
turies has caused the GOY to ‘limp’. 
2.2 The Rationale of Tribal Politics
Kidnappings in Yemen occurred in the early nineties, targeting both foreign-
ers and government offi cials. The kidnappings occurred as a way of pressur-
izing the government to provide services, employment and/or implement devel-
opment projects. The kidnappings were the only tool available to some of the 
neglected tribes in order to receive the services they were seeking, as all other 
government channels were blocked or not simply unavailable. And, strangely 
enough, this kind of behavior is imbedded in Yemeni culture, from the time of 
the Imam’s rule – for kidnappings of tribal families and keeping them in Sanaa, 
as ‘guests’, were used to force tribes to submit to the Imam’s power and sover-
eignty in the area. According to the ICG, the government has also made use of 
hostage-taking practices for the same purposes.14 
12  Drivers of Change Study, commissioned by DFID and RNE 2004, ARD study on Demo-
cratic Governance in Yemen 2003, ICG report on Yemen 2003
13  ICG briefi ng report
14  In most cases, tribal clashes take the form of revenge killings and land disputes.
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The GoY has responded every time, and has ‘delivered’ under the circum-
stances but it has also dealt with this problem fi rmly, and has worked extensively 
to bring stability to the country. The GoY has thus been made alert and sensi-
tive to the needs of the people in those areas. National plans for development 
have been infl uenced by powerful tribes – marginalizing, therefore, tribes with 
less power. The only way of getting government attention for the weaker tribes 
was via ransom – yet, in a democratic system, such things should not occur.
The major challenge for good government that GoY has had to confront 
over the last decade has been the integration of the quite different political, 
economic and institutional arrangements that existed in the North and South of 
the country prior to 1990s unifi cation. This process is still ongoing, though an 
important achievement of the post-unifi cation era has been a growing consen-
sus around a common national identity and a commitment to democracy.  In 
spite of the advent of elections, however, political power still remains central-
ized in the hands of a largely unaccountable and non-transparent executive. 
Furthermore, the administrative and judicial systems are not independent from 
each other. Affairs of government continue to be organized largely along tribal 
lines, with personal relations frequently taking precedence over the public good 
in resource allocation decisions.  This has manifested itself in the high levels of 
corruption and rent-seeking that characterize large swathes of the public sec-
tor.  While the PRSP does represent a signifi cant and positive departure, it is 
clear that the government currently lacks the capacity to effectively implement 
a nationwide poverty-reduction strategy due to pervasive weaknesses in policy 
as well as in institutional and governance frameworks. A lack of technical man-
power also contributes in a major way to Yemen’s under-development. 
Tribes have often been analyzed from a confl ict perspective,15 though tribal-
ism itself is often misunderstood by western scholars. 
It would be misguided, however, to over-emphasize the problems of tribal-
ism.  A frequent comment heard during the course of this research was that 
tribes and tribalism per se are not the cause of Yemen’s problems – indeed, 
working with them and some of their traditional practices (particularly in local 
dispute resolution) may be an important part of a solution to Yemen’s develop-
ment problems. In this view, the cause of inter-tribal confl ict is not a culturally-
based resorting to acts of violence but a lack of services – education, health, 
water, sanitation – that has created an environment of insecurity and competi-
tion in which recourse to violence would seem a rational response. 
A further recurrent theme linked to the argument regarding the need to work 
with rather than around tribal structures was the need to differentiate between 
problems confronting particular tribal regions: in many, the lack of services, 
particularly health and education, was a major problem (and a source of inter-
tribal tensions); in others it was access to water. Yemenis who were interviewed 
as part of this study emphasized time and again that the problems confront-
ing Ta’izz are not the same as those confronting Aden, let alone Hadramawt, 
Sana’a, Marib or Sa`da. So the clear implication is the need to tailor develop-
15  Views here are expressed in the ICG report 2003 and the Yemen Times issue 37, August 
2000 (to name but two).
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ment programs to the needs of particular tribal communities rather than at-
tempting to address ‘tribalism’ per se.
2.3 State-tribal relations
 There is an open debate about the tribal-state relationship that is slightly 
alarming; it argues that the state will not hesitate to manipulate tribes in order 
to achieve greater political power. And, indeed, historical precedents show that 
the Imams favored this method – while various political observers continue to 
feel that the government of Yemen has adopted the same approach.16 Given 
the magnitude and infl uence that the tribe possesses in the lives of people in 
Yemeni society, efforts to destroy this power may seem logical, though, that is, 
when one seems to have two governments in one state (the formal government 
of Yemen and the informal tribal rule). This does not contribute to either secu-
rity, stability, political or development progress. 
However, the question here is whether we are eliminating a tribal concept or 
a tribal reality when we attempt to weaken tribes – and for what purpose? Can 
the tribe evolve into something more urban and civil?
There is a common conception that tribal confl icts serve the government, 
as such occurrences undermine and eat into the powers of tribes, and also 
weaken and divide them. This works perfectly for a state which is afraid of any 
future tribal alliance that might pose a real threat on the central government.
It is important to remember that, as far as a third-party is concerned, state-
tribal relations have solely been state-tribal relations, meaning that the state 
was not ready for other players to interfere in this relationship in any respect. 
Whether the purpose of interfering is political, religious, developmental or for 
purposes of humanitarian aid, the Yemeni government has always had to check 
the real incentives behind these interventions – and deal with them appropri-
ately. The following are some of the examples of how government has dealt 
with tribes in the last three decades:
Divide and Rule: by turning tribes against each other. This tactic has 
been most useful in weakening tribes
Rewards, which included payments of arms, money or agricultural 
lands, as well as allowing tribes to loot urban areas (for example, in 
1948, tribes were allowed to sack the city of Sanaa as punishment for 
its inhabitants’ collaboration in the assassination of Imam Yahya)17
16  Political interfering in Yemeni politics has been resorted to by the Saudis since the early 
seventies, and has always supported the Northern Tribes on the borders for the purpose of op-
posing the government. The recent civil war in Sada in 2003/2004 shows that the government is 
intolerant of any kind of external intervention. On the development front, the most recent clash 
of interests that the NDI was subject to in its tribal reconciliation program was requests from 
the government to end this program – the justifi cation being that NDI’s role might be mistaken 
as a CIA or FBI plan to fi nd out more about tribal structures and terrorists in Yemen. The tribes 
had approached the NDI in 2004 to put together a coalition to stop blood fl owing, yet fearing 
that this would lead to a strong alliance between the tribes, meaning that they would become a 
threatening power, the program was halted.
17  Yemen Development Challenges, Colburn, p 17.
•
•
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Punishments – in the form of hostage taking during the Immamate pe-
riod, when the Imam would take the family members of a specifi c tribe 
and hold them hostage in his palace. If the tribe of a hostage/hostages 
opposed the Imam’s authority, the hostages were killed.18
Land and border disputes
Lack of services to weak or non-loyal tribes
Slow development of oil-producing terrain
The Yemeni government may, like other states, use ‘anti-terrorism con-
cerns’ to pursue its own (non-related) political objectives19. After the 
September 11 attacks on the US, more assistance has been given to 
Yemen to deal with the war on terror.
Revenge Killings: Hundred of Yemenis are injured or killed each year 
in tribal confl icts. 20 The use of lethal weaponry and the erosion of tribal 
norms that severely sanction doing harm to vulnerable groups such as 
women and children have contributed to a rise in the number of injuries 
and deaths. Revenge killings stir up the tribes, causing them to often 
move/migrate from one place to another in a period of war.  Despite 
the Yemeni’s president call for a ceasefi re against tribes, the killings go 
on.
2.4 The need for action…
Fighting among different tribes is more common if the tribes concerned are 
Ma’reb, Al-Jawf, Shabwah, Al-Dhale’, Abyan, Sa’dah; and those surrounding 
Sana’a – Khawlan, Hamdan, Arhab, Nehm, Hashed, etc. Thousands of people 
had been killed or wounded during years of bloodshed. More than 39 people 
were killed and more then 200 injured in June 2000 clashes between the Wailah 
and Dahm tribes near the Saudi-Yemen borders.21
The government of Yemen does not use resources to react effectively when 
such clashes occur – indeed, it often turns its back, allowing the tribes to handle 
it all. At times, the government does not have either resources or any actual 
interest in mediating when it comes to tribal disputes – as long as these small-
scale tribal confl icts do not affect divisions of power in the country. People of-
ten take the law into their own hands to settle differences; thus, it is not overly 
strange to see people in the streets with more than just a jambia on their waist, 
for guns, Kalashnikovs, bazookas and other light arms are a common acces-
sory for certain groups and individuals.
State-tribal relations are by no means always ones of confl ict.  Neverthe-
less, tribes and tribal leaders, independently of whatever role they might play 
18  Manea 1998, p3.
19  ICG Report, p1. On 3 November 2002, an unmanned U.S. “Predator” aircraft hovering in 
the skies of Yemen fi red a Hellfi re missile at a car carrying a suspected al-Qaeda leader, four 
Yemenis said to be members of the Aden-Abyan Islamic Army, and a Yemeni-American who, 
according to U.S. authorities, had recruited volunteers to attend al-Qaeda training camps. All 
six occupants were killed – and this has raised questions about the nature of US-Yemeni co-
operation and the power that the Yemeni government is acquiring as a result of this new US 
alliance.
20  ICG Report, p13
21  Yemen Times, Issue 35 - August 28th - September 3rd 2000, Vol X
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in the institutions of government, cherish and forcefully protect their autono-
my.  Furthermore, the newness of the modern state, rampant corruption, and a 
stalled democratic reform process also create an environment which sustains 
tribal authorities as a signifi cant focal point of power. 
In a number of respects, state-tribal relations exacerbate the range of con-
fl ict situations:
Tribes continue to feel marginalized and excluded from decision-mak-
ing processes. Tribal leaders are not happy with the government’s fail-
ure to deliver basic infrastructure and provide for social services, such 
as education and health. Also, some tribes reside and often own the 
lands that are being operated on by foreign companies for oil and gas 
extraction – and recognizing that the product generates 50% of the oil 
revenues in the oil sector, people here are disappointed with the kind of 
services they are subsequently getting (in comparison with other areas 
too) – and they link this problem with the endemic corruption.
The most important dynamic in the complex web of state-tribe relation-
ships is the manner in which tribal differences and divisions are ma-
nipulated by President Salih, as he plays one off against the other in a 
way that ensures that none is powerful enough to displace his authority 
– and which also serves to divert attention from the inadequacies of the 
central government.  Salih manages these tribal differences via a net-
work of patronage and corruption; and such things limit, if not weaken, 
the authority of the state, institutionalization of the rule of law, they also 
stymie democratic reform processes. 
The government continues to have a negative view of tribal leaders, 
seeing them as a bunch of thugs, nomads and people who are more 
likely to be violent than move in the direction of political discourse. They 
are often viewed as being ‘backward’, incapable of making informed 
decisions or effective use of the resources and aid they are given – and 
in need of guidance or control by the state.
3 Strategic Priority Recommendations
3.1 For the Yemeni Government
Regulating social behavior through law and enforcement. It is impossi-
ble to take any act by the government seriously unless the government 
shows its political will and works to enforce the rule on everyone.
Assuring quality and equity between all segments of society.
The state monopoly over tribal confl ict resolution is not solving anything 
– as regards tribes – at the moment. Tribal confl icts ought to be included 
in the government’s plans and properly dealt with, whether using do-
mestic or international resources. It is important to craft a strategy and a 
planning methodology via which to integrate tribes into Yemeni politics. 
A steering committee that will require tribal leaders to begin negotia-
tions with the state, in open debate, will shift the current situation, and 
more pragmatic solutions can then be found.
•
•
•
•
•
•
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Altering the central focus and expanding development assistance so 
that it gets to rural areas; also, engaging local communities and help 
them fi nd ways to integrate themselves with the center.
With large aid assistance programs, the resources and capacities of 
both the donors and the state will need to be increased.
In most cases, tribal areas at the present time contain no signs of a 
modern life: there are no services, schools, industries or any means for 
the people to contribute/do something useful for their communities. In 
some way, killings have become the only thing some persons are famil-
iar with – these are the reason why they exist. Finding ways to generate 
employment for tribal persons will give the tribesmen something to look 
towards. A search for alternatives is crucial in this context. It is important 
to know that the way of life and lack of choices is one of the reasons 
why tribesmen behave the way they do. Yemen needs to reverse its 
trend in the direction of alarming unemployment rates.
Getting the whole of society involved in the tribal issue is essential, 
and stimulating parliament to talk freely about tribal problems – and 
fi nd strategic ways to solve them. This domain has to move beyond the 
sole authority of the state and be discussed more openly and freely by 
the public. There are some urban areas in Yemen were people do not 
comprehend or even know about tribal practices. Most Yemeni citizens 
who reside in big cities (such as Sana’a or Aden) absolutely do not un-
derstand the magnitude of the problem, or see ways in which it might 
be solved.
Enhancing people’s trust in the government of Yemen and the effective-
ness of state institutions; while administrative procedures, for all, should 
be free, fair and predictable/reliable.
Continual Human rights violations jeopardize Yemeni democracy to a 
major extent – indeed this is often the ‘barometer’ determining if Yemen 
is becoming more or less democratic. Freedom of expression and other 
basic rights – which the constitution gives the Yemeni citizen – need to 
be implemented.
Policy planning in terms of fi nding ways to integrate tribal laws into the 
judicial system. This might even facilitate ways of blending tribes, grad-
ually, in with urban communities. Tribal disputes can start to be resolved 
formally in a court house in the same way that it is done in the tribal con-
text – though having it done in a governmental institution may steadily 
introduce the idea of order, substituting a judge for the Sheikh, etc.
3.2 For the International Donor Community
In more than once case, donor interference with tribal politics has wors-
ened the tribal situation, and has led to the suspension of hope and 
a weakening of the state’s credibility. The donor community needs to 
avoid having direct contact with tribes – it needs to work through the 
government, having a clear and transparent agenda and effective com-
munications with society (either via the media or press releases). It is 
critical that Yemeni society understands what sort of possibilities are 
available with regard to change – and can then decide if there is room 
for that envisaged change. Donors need to ‘give room’ to Yemeni peo-
ple so that they can handle tribe-related projects (that is, if donors are 
serious about their intentions in resolving confl icts).
•
•
•
•
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There is often a taboo when it comes to dealing with the government 
and with corruption issues in Yemen (regarding donors). Donors in Ye-
men lack the capacity to follow up on such issues, as they have no 
understanding of the local political economy. Thus, it is important that 
donors take this debate to the local level and support long-term sus-
tainable dialogue on this issue via the supporting of think-tanks or the 
Yemeni public policy community. 
Practical approaches with regard to work in Yemen should be intro-
duced, which would look at the current situation in the country – i.e. and 
not so much at the theory of government.
With large-scale aid assistance programs, the resources and capacities 
of both donors and the state will have to be increased. This is not limited 
to fi nancial resources, either – but also to programming expertise.
•
•
•
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Appendix
Key Meetings
Frances Guy: Head of Engaging with the Islamic World, Former British 
Ambassador to Yemen, Foreign Commonwealth Offi ce, London, UK
Sefotn Darby: Governance Advisor, Extractive Industry Transparency 
Initiative, DFID, UK
Henry Thomson: EITI Expert, London, UK
Ahmed Al Yamani Fredrich Ebert Siftung
Carlo Binda, Head of the Parliamentarians Program, NDI, Yemen
Robin Madrid, Head of the NDI Yemen
Faisal Abu Raas, Yemeni Member of Parliament
Samra Al Shaibani. Senior Communication Offi cer, World Bank
Ramesh Saharta, UNICEF Representative in Yemen
Ali Saif, Chairman of Political Yemeni Forum
Marta Colborn Jordan Revir Foundation
Jennifer Lofi ng, Director, International Programs, Partners for Demo-
cratic Change
Prof. Mohammed Mogram, International law Professor, University of 
Sanaa, Yemen
Mr.Ali Saif, Acting Vice Minister of Planning and International Coopera-
tion, Yemen
Mr. Habib Sharif, Program Manager, GTZ
Dr.Prof Waheeba Faraa, former Minister of Human Rights in Yemen, 
President of Arwa University
Nadia Al Saqaf, Chief Editor in Yemen Times
Hamoud Munnasar, Chief of Operations for the Al Arabia news channel
Stefania burka, Senior Communication Offi cer, Danish Program in Yemen
Janet Alberda, Political Attache, Dutch Embassy in Yemen
Fares Asaad, Politcal attaché, US Embassy in Yemen
Antelak Al Mutwakel, Chairwoman of Girls Education World NGO
Nabil Shaiban, Director General of Ministry of Planning, Sanaa, Yemen
Dr. Yahia Al Muwakel, Acting Vice Minister of the Ministry of Planning, 
Head of the Poverty Reduction and Monitoring Unit
Hendrik Selle, political attaché of the German Embassy
Robert Hindle, former head of the World Bank in Yemen, current head 
of Organizational Integrity, DC, USA
Magda Al Sanousi, Program Manager, Oxfam GB, Yemen
Julie Mcarthy, Revenue Watch, NY, USA
Anthony Rechter, Revenue Watch, NY USA
Sina Oudegbemi, ICD Communication Advisor, DFID, London, UK
Eamoin Taylor, ICD Communication Advisor, DFID, London, UK
Alison Cochrance, EITI-DFID, London UK
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